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Executive Summary

Private sector potential and pitfalls: Private sector growth has taken place with too little policy to guide
growth. Private sector utilization is particularly high in EMR states where public sector spending on health
is low and consequently shows private sector emergence as a result of insufficient or underperforming
public sector services. Essential information on private sector composition, service coverage, quality and
pricing continues to be patchy, although notable efforts have started in many states. We find from recent
studies that the private sector has fairly adequate quality of services in middle and high income countries
but needs quality oversight in low income countries. Payment for private health services can be substantial
to catastrophic even for routine, less complicated procedures such as C-sections, highlighting need for
safety nest.
Public Private Partnerships are shaped by local context: Private sector contribution varies according
to the context of particular countries, and hence demands locally responsive strategies for harnessing the
value added services. In certain states, government partnerships with private sector have focused on specialty
hospital services to complement gaps in government services, in others states these have been targeted
towards private sector management experience of hospital and diagnostic facility, while in yet other countries
private health sector has established itself in providing primary care services in urban centers and also
expanding to rural areas.
Regulation to harness private sector: approach, coordination and enforcement: Regulation of entry of
private health providers and of Industry in some form is in practice in all EMR states. However, regulation
of hospitals and clinics remains a grossly overlooked area, least innovations have been practiced here and
is necessary for harnessing private sector towards UHC. For enactment of regulation, policy coordination
is required between larger economic private sector growth policies and those enacted by Health. The notion
of stewardship is only beginning to be realized in Ministries of Health and needs to be practically backed
up by formal dedicated structures for regulation either within or outside the Ministry of Health. These need
to be supported by databases for private sector mapping, accreditation tools and adequate human resource
and budgetary support. The essential approach to regulation remains undecided and uncertain in most states,
and new approaches involving multi-stakeholder regulation and use of incentives and self-accreditation
options are important options as opposed to punitive action and state as the sole actor. Consumer information
while available to varying extent for drugs and food products, has not been extended to health services in
the EMR, requires a multiplicity of arrangements to serve as an effective tool for patient safety and financial
access. Consumer information and protection relies on a multiplicity of arrangements across Legal Ministry,
Health Ministry, Consumer Bodies and Private Health Providers, and if hastily introduced can lead to delays
in redress, unnecessary litigations and growth of expensive medical technology as defensive mechanism
by medical sector.

Executive Summary
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Attainment of Universal Health Coverage is a progressive realization for EMR Member States and can be
accomplished by expanding breadth of population covered by services, depth of services covered and
expanding extent of financial risk protection. The private sector has grown exponentially in most EMR
states, and remains an untapped key partner for moving towards Universal Health Coverage. Regulation,
information provision and purchasing of services remain important tools for harnessing private sector towards
strategic UHC goals.

v
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Purchasing Health Services: Financial, Technical, Market & Political Considerations: Purchasing private
health services has been more widely practiced than regulation in developing economies and also has a
growing body of evidence on its effectiveness. Purchasing of private sector services for Health initially
started out in the EMR in the area of support services for hospital, expanded to hospital beds and specialty
services, and more recently has involved purchasing primary and preventive care services from NGOs.
Purchasing by the state in the EMR has usually been through evolving national health insurance schemes,
contracting out the management of government health facilities, contracting out private sector for specific
service delivery schemes, and in a couple of countries through health vouchers and community health
insurance.

vi

But can PPPs work? Global evidence provides encouraging and significant evidence of overall impact of
PPPs on increasing the use of primary care services but there is uneven increase across different services
and much depends on design of PPPs. Although PPPs have increased access to services, they have generally
not reached the poorest segments of the population. Amongst the different PPPs, vouchers have the best
service coverage, at least for safe motherhood and primary care, followed by CBHI and NHI schemes. PPPs
have resulted in improvement of infrastructure; availability of drugs, staff and supplies, but information on
technical process of care remains thin. There is inconclusive evidence as to whether PPPs can bring about
a reduction in patient OOP expenditure. Few instances of reduction in client expenditure have been reported
for CBHIs and NHI schemes but there are data gaps for contracting out and voucher schemes.
Drivers and constraints for PPPs: Contracting experiences has shown that the private sector grows and adapts
in response to purchasing. However, necessary preparatory work within government needs to be built prior
to purchasing of services. This requires demarcated structures for open competitive tendering to avoid
monopolies as well as skills for prior estimation of unit costs, development of performance based contracts,
and independent monitoring. Costs of purchasing private sector services and enrolment of low income
clientele can be high, and need to be built into state budgets prior to embarking on PPPs. Policy support
for purchasing and financing the private sector for UHC has tended to be lukewarm and country experience
shows that a slow and cautious expansion of PPPs over time has been better for fostering trust and harmonial
working between public and private sectors. Lastly, while the policy push for PPPs has usually come from
international donors, there needs to be caution in use of donor funding for embarking of PPPs for UHC as
this can lead to fragile programs.

Executive Summary

Chapter 1:
Introduction and Overview of Private Health Sector in EMR

Background
Universal Health Coverage: The background paper of World Health Assembly 2005 defines Universal
Health Coverage (UHC) as access to key promotive, preventive, curative and rehabilitative health interventions
for all at an affordable cost, thereby achieving equity in access (World Health Assembly, 2005). The diverse
definition attempts to include disadvantaged and excluded groups in terms of access to care ensuring that
financial hardships do not act as a barrier in that regard (OConnell at al, 2013). Universal Health Coverage
(UHC) is an integral approach to a countrys overall human and economic development strategy. UHC has
also been defined in the Rio+20 Political Declaration as being crucial to enhancing health, social cohesion
and sustainable human and economic development (United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development
2012, p. 25) and has received considerable attention at a global stage, particularly within the debate on the
post-2015 development goals (United Nations 2013, p. 38). Importantly the WHO-EMRO has developed
and endorsed a framework for action on advancing Universal Health Coverage in the Eastern Mediterranean
Region based on the following four domains:
·
·
·
·

Developing a vision and strategy for universal health coverage
Addressing coverage of financial risk protection
Expanding the coverage of needed health services
Ensuring population eligibility, entitlement and actual coverage

Challenges to UHC: The private sector has in the past two decades expanded significantly in this Region.
In some countries, an estimated 70% of the population seek healthcare from the private sector.1 Yet issues
related to the private health sector [PHS] have not been addressed properly by many Ministries of Health
[MoH]. In most low and middle income countries of the Eastern Mediterranean Region [EMR] the perceived
quality of care in the public sector is poor and accessibility and affordability to comprehensive health services
is a challenge. Even in high income EMR states, where quality is expected to be less of an issue, there
is insufficient information and lack of database on private health sector. Moreover, private sector health
care providers have no or minimum role in national health policies. This is not only due to lack or insufficient
information and intelligence with regard to the private health sector, but also lack of trust between
public and private sectors, poor or absence of regulatory mechanism that can bring the health care
providers at public and private sectors together etc. However, there is evidence across the world that
the private health sector can contribute effectively in all three dimensions of universal health coverage
[UHC].
Public Private Partnerships for UHC: Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) have gained significant global
policy attention in recent times, and have been implemented by a growing number of countries within and
outside the EMR. A notable although less visible trend is also seen now in focal countries of the EMR. PPPs
in the health sector can be defined as an institutional relationship between the government and the private
sector (non-profit organizations, commercial private sector), to achieve a shared health goal on the basis
of a mutually agreed division of labor (Buse and Walt 2000). It requires a written agreement that specifies
the obligations of each organization involved, the objectives of the partnership, and how the partnership
will be managed or governed (Widdus 2003).
1 Health systems strengthening in countries of the Eastern Mediterranean Region: challenges, priorities and options for future action,
EM/RC59/Tech.Disc.1. http://applications.emro.who.int/docs/RC_technical_papers_2012_Tech_Disc_1_14613_EN.pdf

1

Public private partnerships are essential in moving towards Universal Health Coverage so as to fill gaps
in coverage, prevent government from over stretching its capacity in delivering for all, and harnessing the
siloed and rapidly growing private sector towards national and state policy goals. Regulation, provision of
consumer information, and purchasing of private health services are essential to ensure that issues of quality
of services and patient safety are integrated into private health care delivery, in addition to access and equity
of public sector services.
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Public private partnerships can be informal such as involving the provision incentives, target setting , training
and support for supplies to the private health sector by the state, or can be more explicit and formal involving
purchasing of services by the state or binding legislative control.
Recent work by WHO-EMRO: Mapping the PHS in EMR countries is one of the priorities which have been
identified by the Regional Office. A commitment to do so was included in a paper presented to the 59th
session of the Regional Committee held in Egypt during October 20122. Developing a regional strategy for
cooperation with private sector was the main message of the private sector side meeting discussion of the
60th RC side meeting. Over 2013, EMRO completed preliminary analysis of private sector in EMR countries
and two studies on regulation of private sector in the region and presented in RC 60.

Purpose
This paper provides material for discussion on harnessing of the private health sector in the EMR, by pulling
together published material from within the region, and supplementing with hard evidence from outside the
EMR. Despite limitations in availability of data and the challenges associated with data mining, a systematic
effort has been made to pull together the best available data and information.
Specifically, this paper provides information for discussion on the following areas:
·
·
·
·

Current role of the private sectors with a particular emphasis on regulation, consumer information and
purchasing/ financing of private health services towards UHC.
Analysis of success drivers and constraints in strengthening role of private health sector in setting
regulatory mechanism and service provision in the countries.
Based on the above to propose a framework that includes regulations, service provision, and financing
as basis for enhanced role of the private sector in moving towards UHC.
Propose a list of priorities for EMR states and role of the WHO in supporting member states in
strengthening Public Private Partnership.

Private Sector in EMR: An Overview
The important role of the private health sector [PHS] in care delivery of most countries of the Eastern
Mediterranean Region [1] is increasingly being acknowledged by the ministries of health in the Region.
Despite this recognition, it has not been possible to formulate an evidence-based strategy on the role and
contribution of the private health sector in provision of health care services in moving towards universal
health coverage.

1Group 1: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates; Group 2: Egypt, Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon,
Libya, Morocco, occupied Palestinian territory, Syrian Arab Republic and Tunisia; Group 3: Afghanistan, Djibouti, Pakistan, Somalia, South Sudan,
Sudan and Yemen.
2 Health systems strengthening in countries of the Eastern Mediterranean Region: challenges, priorities and options for future action EM/RC59/Tech.Disc.1
September 2012. Regional Committee for the Eastern Mediterranean Fifty-ninth session.
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Eastern Mediterranean Regional Office [EMRO] recent assessment of private health sector in twelve countries
shows that the role of the private health sector is not well defined, its capacities are poorly understood, their
contribution in preventive care and screening is not optimal and even practices and care delivery are not
monitored. The range of services provided is variable from one to another private care provider within same
country, standards are questionable, regulation is poor and there is insufficient information about financial
burden to the users of these services. The user rates for private sector in relation to outpatient services ranges
from 33% to 86%3. From 11% to 81% poorest quintile in the same groups of the countries uses private sector
services4.

Private Sector Composition and Contribution to Healthcare Delivery in EMR Countries

Figure 1.1 Private Health Sector Utilization in EMR Countries
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The data from the recent surveys and reports from World Health Organization and other sources acknowledge
the growing influence of the private health sector in the health systems and service delivery of these countries.
The private sector accounts for 10% -90% of health service utilization in EMR member states with some
much as 50%-90% in some of the low and middle income countries (Figure 1.1).

Overall Private Sector Utilization

Source: Assessment of Private Health Sector in 12 Countries. WHO EMRO, 2013

Private Sector Growth in the EMR
The need for better understanding of the role, capacities and contribution of the private health sector in the
EMR region has been identified. Despite a paucity of data, available information suggests unprecedented
growth of private sector in many countries of the region. The private sector hospitals make up for up to 20%
of the total number of hospital beds in most countries and even go up to a range of 40-80% in certain
countries (Figure 1.2).

3 Assessment of private health sector in 12 countries. WHO EMRO, 2013.
4 Demographic Health Survey (DHS) for selected EMR countries,
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Figure 1.2 Private Health Sector Composition and Growth
(Number of Hospital Beds in a Country)
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Total Private Sector Beds in a Country

Source: Assessment of Private Health Sector in 12 Countries. WHO EMRO, 2013

A Comparison of Private vs. Public Health Expenditure and Utilization
Private health expenditure, mainly in the form of patient Out of Pocket (OOP) Payment, in the EMR is
higher in Low income (LIC) and Lower Middle Income Countries (LMICs) such as Afghanistan, Yemen
and Pakistan as opposed to GCC countries of Oman, UAE, Qatar, Kuwait etc. Member states, such as the
higher incomes states in the EMR, that have higher levels of public spending on health have lower spending
by households (Figure 1.3). Interestingly as spending by public sector decreases on health, there is higher
utilization of private healthcare sector (Figure 1.4) demonstrating that declining budgets lead to ineffective
public sector services providing opportunity for growth and replacement of services by private sector.
Figure 1.3 Public Sector versus Out of Pocket Private Sector Health
Expenditure
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Figure 1.4 Private Health Sector Utilization Compared to Public Sector
Health Expenditure
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On a larger landscape, it is quite evident that the private healthcare sector has shown tremendous growth
in recent years in the EMR countries and despite lacking the sufficient data on the effectiveness, quality
of care and its overall impact on respective health systems, the private health sector is playing a significant
role in these economies. In some of the countries, it is a source of boost of the economy and in many; it is
the major source of healthcare access and availability for a larger proportion of the population.

Private Health Sector in EMR Countries: Applying the Quality Lens
The perceived quality of the private healthcare services is generally considered to be high amongst the
population. However, there have been contradicting reports in this aspect and there is also evidence suggesting
that the usual higher expenditures in private sector doesnt necessarily translate into high quality. By
applying the lens of quality of care in terms of drugs availability, patients records and their satisfaction,
the quality and availability of infrastructure, staff capacity and skills, it could be seen that private sector in
different EMR countries exhibit different characteristics.

WHO-EMRO: BACKGROUND PAPER

Source: Assessment of Private Health Sector in 12 Countries. WHO EMRO, 2013

Quality of Out-patient Services: Case of Diabetes Mellitus Care
A recent study conducted by WHO-EMRO (WHO, 2013) suggests that most of the outpatient settings in
private facilities had availability of basic infrastructure for patient examination, equipment, and maintained
patient records. However the only low-middle income country assessed showed sub-optimal levels availability
of essential drugs, patient record maintenance and availability of recommended tests. Common quality issues
seen in the private sector of different states included the provision of refresher courses to staff, presence
of IEC material, patient feedback mechanisms and availability of cost effective test for screening of
complications. Overall, patients were satisfied with the quality of care provided but in some countries they
had reservations regarding staff attitude.

Chapter 1: Introduction and Overview of Private Health Sector in EMR
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MoH

Source: Quality Assessment and Cost/Pricing Estimates of Diabetes and C-Section Services at Private Health
Sector in Selected EMR Countries. WHO EMRO, 2013
Likewise, the private sector in GCC states performs quite well in terms of staffing strength which also
includes refresher trainings and courses for the staff as well as availability of care and service delivery
guidelines and patient follow up. The private sector in these countries also demonstrate strength in other
areas like availability of diagnostics tests, maintenance of patients records and providing patients with
health education sessions. These countries though demonstrate need for improvement in terms of distribution
of information and education material for the patients and instituting feedback mechanisms in terms of
patients follow up care. The Lebanese private health sector is a mediocre performer in most of the quality

6

Chapter 1: Introduction and Overview of Private Health Sector in EMR

relevant domains whereas the private sector of Pakistan fares the worst. The only area where all the five
countries need tremendous amount of work to be done is establishing coordination mechanisms between
the private health sector facilities and the Ministry of Health (MoH). There is little evidence across the
board regarding sharing of data and statistics with the ministry thus inhibiting regulation and affecting
quality of care.
The patients satisfaction levels with the quality of private healthcare services were generally high among
the five countries that are subject of discussion. Quite surprisingly, this was also the case for Pakistan.
However, in Lebanon and Pakistan, a significant proportion of patients expressed their dissatisfaction with
the staffs attitude.

Quality parameters of infrastructure, service availability, essential drugs and diagnostic services were
generally satisfactory in the private sector of the reviewed EMR countries. However, the private sector in
Pakistan had gaps in terms of critical aspects of neonatal and maternity services delivery infrastructure,
patients record keeping, and the availability of guidelines for performing an emergency C-section (Table
1.2). Generally the private sector performed better in terms of in-patient quality parameters as compared
to out-patient settings. Several of the EMR states reviewed showed high levels of elective emergency sections
being performed in the private sector with as much as 90% in Saudi Arabia. There was unevenness in terms
of communication to patient on reason for C-section. A major weakness across all reviewed states was the
low sharing of data with MoH.

Chapter 1: Introduction and Overview of Private Health Sector in EMR
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The Quality of In-patient Services: Case of Caesarean Section

7
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Source: Quality Assessment and Cost/Pricing Estimates of Diabetes and C-Section Services at Private Health Sector
in Selected EMR Countries. WHO EMRO, 2013
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Private Health Sector in EMR Countries: A look through the Cost and Pricing Lens
There is considerable variation in private health sector in terms of unit cost of hospitalization as seen in the
case of C-section assessed in selected EMR countries (Figure 1.5). While allowing for purchasing
power disparities, the range varies considerably even within similar economic bracket countries such
as Jordan, Morocco and Lebanon, and maybe due to level of competition offered by the private
sector market.
Expenditure on hospital care availed at private health sector consumes a significant proportion of the
annual household income in most of the reviewed EMR countries (Figure 1.6). This was seen to range
from 28.6% to 40.5% bordering on catastrophic health expenditure for at least 2 of the four countries
reviewed, while only Lebanon with an expansive private sector market showed rates had adjusted to meet
patient incomes.
Figure 1.5 Average C-Section Expenditure in Selected EMR Countries
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Source: Quality Assessment and Cost/Pricing Estimates of Diabetes and C-Section Services at Private
Health Sector in Selected EMR Countries. WHO EMRO, 2013
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Source: Quality Assessment and Cost/Pricing Estimates of Diabetes and C-Section Services at Private Health
Sector in Selected EMR Countries. WHO EMRO, 2013
Financing and Pricing for In-patient Care: Financing mechanism for in-patient care in private setting
is predominantly pre-paid cover in three out of the four EMR member states reviewed. More than half of
the users of in-patient services for C-section were covered by any form of insurance in Jordan, Morocco
and Lebanon. However, major source of financing is out of pocket payment in Pakistan for in-patient services
(Figure 1.7).
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Source: Quality Assessment and Cost/Pricing Estimates of Diabetes and C-Section Services at Private Health
Sector in Selected EMR Countries. WHO EMRO, 2013
Less than half of the users of C-section services reported availability of pricing guidelines in Private sector
health facilities in Pakistan, Jordan and Lebanon. The situation is even worse in Morocco where such pricing
guidelines are almost non-existent and not a single patient could access such guidelines (Figure 1.8).
Figure 1.8 Proporation of Patients reporting Availability of Expense/Pricing
Guidelines
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Source: Quality Assessment and Cost/Pricing Estimates of Diabetes and C-Section Services at Private Health
Sector in Selected EMR Countries. WHO EMRO, 2013

Summary
Private sector growth has taken place in all EMR countries with private sector as an important player for
UHC. Private sector utilization is particularly high in EMR states where public sector spending on health
is low and consequently shows private sector emergence as a result of insufficient or underperforming public
sector services. Essential information on private sector composition, service coverage, quality and pricing
continues to be patchy, although notable efforts have started in many states.
Data collected from outpatient for diabetes and from inpatient for C-section has shown high scores on:
availability of appropriate infrastructure, equipments, drugs, staff; and patient satisfaction in private sector
of most EMR countries. However, absence of proper Health management Information System (HMIS) and
co-ordination mechanism with MoH was a common lacking in most of EMR countries with potential to
affect regulation and quality of care.
OOP expenditure is higher in countries where there is more utilization of private sector. However, substantial
variations have been seen for in-patient care according to country context. In at least two of the four states
reviewed for OOP expenditure, the OOP spending was close to or at catastrophic expenditure. While private
sector cannot be overlooked for UHC, strategies, plans, and implementation roll outs, states must build in
adequate safety nets while involving private sector use and also data sharing on health services and oversight
on quality standards.
10
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Chapter 2:
Regulation of Private Health Sector

What is Regulation and Why Regulate?
The private health sector although robust and expanding in most EMR countries, is faced with issues related
to uncertain quality, high pricing, skewed distribution in major urban centers, and dual links between public
and private sector, as discussed in above section. The large and expanding size of the private sector and too
little policy defining parameters for private sector growth has increasingly marketized the health sector
(Teerawattananon Y 2013).
Regulation is one of the key mechanisms that can be used for addressing some of these areas and harnessing
the private sector towards accessible and quality care for UHC. Regulation occurs when government controls
or deliberately tries to influence the activities of individuals or institutions through manipulation of target
variables such as quantity, quality, price, distribution and provision of certain services such as public goods
(Kumaranayake 1998; Kumaranayake and Lake 2002).
Specific issues that call for policy regulatory action are:
·

·

·

There are significant areas of overlaps of service provision between the public and private sectors,
leading to unnecessary duplication of infrastructure in urban areas while gaps in service access
remain in rural areas. Asides from gaps in access, it also causes cost inefficiencies as limited resources
are directed at providing the same service and a culture of competition rather than complementary
provision prevails.
Growing and uncontrolled private sector has led to supplier induced demand for high cost diagnostics,
deviations in prescription from National Essential Drug Lists, and an unnecessary use of expensive
services and procedures (Bennet 1994). Hence expansion of private sector, while often meant
to provide better access to health care usually comes with an escalation in out of pocket
expenditure.
With growth of private sector there has been an expansion in private medical insurance which while
expanding access to services has not always resulted in patients consuming the right balance of
promotive and preventive care, with tilt instead towards curative care, and its role in overall
improvement in health indicators remains unestablished.

Regulatory Approaches, Control Knobs and Implementation Mechanisms
Four Regulation knobs as outlined in Table 2.1 can be used to exert regulatory changes for Health Services
or Medical Products. These can be used singly or in combination, and include Quantity, Distribution, Quality
and Cost/Pricing. Regulation in most countries is focused on Quantity of providers/services, with less use
of other controls.
Currently there are two types of approaches underpinning choice of control knobs. The social approach
focusing on quality and patient safety has been the one more widely practiced across most countries with
varying success (Kumaranayake 1998). The other economic approach is more expensive dealing with the
larger health market and issues of quantity of private sector providers/ facilities, their distribution and fee
charged for services (Kumaranayake 1998). This has been less well practiced in LMICs but has been the
focus of reform and innovations in more established economies. Countries embarking on private sector
regulation need to decide upfront as to largely which type of approach, the social or economic, they will
be adopting.

WHO-EMRO (HEALTH SYSTEMS DIVISION): BACKGROUND PAPER FOR REGIONAL CONSULTATIVE MEETING
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Table 2.1: Regulation Recipients, Knobs and Mechanisms
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A number of measures applied singly or in combination can be used to implement regulatory control knobs.
Common measures applied in countries are:
·
·
·
·

Legal Control
Policy Guidelines/ Codes of Practice
Financial Incentives
Consumer Information

Country Experience of Regulatory Measures
Generally in the EMR, regulation has received insufficient attention in national policies and strategies.
Regulatory frameworks have been rarely updated, and emphasis continues to be on initial entry rather than
equitable distribution, complementary service packages, improved quality and affordable pricing. A widely
unregulated private sector has left consumers unprotected. External assistance, in the low and lower middle
income countries, has tended to focus more on quick gains through purchasing and less on the long term
gains through strengthened regulations. There is thin documentation of country experience with different
forms of regulation and their effectiveness, and the section below attempts to highlights experiences from
the EMR and other countries.

Legal Control of Individual Providers
Legislation is the most common form of regulation of private sector in most countries, and can carry sanctions
or closure in case of non-compliance. This is practiced in all countries, is commonly directed at licensing
of providers but vaguely applied to medical conduct and ethics. Professional councils or syndicates are
usually responsible for licensing providers as well as medical and allied training institutes and universities.
The modus operandi followed is that of self-regulation rather than state regulation. Experience from a
number of countries, such as Pakistan, Yemen, Egypt, Tanzania and Zambia has so far shown that even
where detailed laws are present, the implementation is usually weak. Subjective interpretation, protection
of members by professional community, and internal rivalries tend to blunt implementation.

Legal Control of Private Facilities
A small number of countries have extended legislation from individual providers to the accreditation of
clinics, hospitals and nursing homes. There is considerable variation on function that is regulated  quality
is more commonly regulated with less instances of price control.
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In both Yemen and Egypt (as in most of EMR countries) private health facilities undergo mandatory licensing.
Yemen s Private Health and Medical Institutions Law is precise in terms of procedures for licensing and
periodic relicensing but specifications are more general in terms of quality of care, number, distribution and
advertising (WHO-EMRO 2013). Lack of crisp specification, database for monitoring and low awareness
of laws amongst public sector officials constrains oversight.

In Egypt, the entry of private health clinics and hospitals controlled through mandatory registration with
the Ministry of Trade and Foreign Industry and the Ministry of Investment, followed by licensing from the
Ministry of Health. The Health licensing aims to ensure a minimum uniform standardization and involves
fixed parameters of licensed staff, Medical Directors registration, and price list. It is unclear what quality
standards are included as part of licensing and the extent to which these are enforced. Prices are also regulated
and professional syndicates are required to set price ceilings for charging by professionals; however rules
are insufficient, vague and not implemented. On ground evaluation shows that implementation can be
improved with stronger checks and governance, and putting up sufficient budgets for enforcement.
Another parallel is provided, from India where regulation can be enacted both by the Federal and
State levels. Private small hospitals in India, of less than 25 beds, are largely unregulated. But two states,
Maharashtra and Delhi have enacted the Nursing Home act for compulsory registration, undertaken by local
municipality and strict board, with yearly reveals (Bhat 1996). Despite a forward moving act, several Nursing
homes remain unregistered due to lack of inspectors, while those registered, lack standard setting and
reporting systems. Similarly, in the case of Tanzania and Zimbabwe, while there is mandatory registration
for clinics and hospitals it is weakly enforced (Kumaranayake 2000).

Provision of Policy Guidelines & Codes of Practice
Lighter touch regulation is provided through provision of policy guidelines and codes of practice but not
backed by a legal act that may lead to sanctions. These can be in form of general guidelines or detailed
prescriptions of quality parameters.

WHO-EMRO: BACKGROUND PAPER

Bargaining by private health facilities is seen in Yemen where a Union of private hospitals has been formed
(WHO-EMRO 2013). This is primarily centered on the benefits of the owners but also coordinates referral
amongst private hospitals and has started continuous medical education which is at early stage. The Union
has been involved by the MoPH in implementation of regulations.

Provision of Accreditation Certificates, trainings and re-accreditation through professional medical, nursing,
dental or pharmacy councils has also been used as lighter touch attempt towards regulation.
In certain countries, these have followed more formalized processed and compliance agreements have been
developed between private providers and accreditation bodies. In the USA for example, enforcement of
codes of practice is basically on the premise of self-regulation rather than state regulation and large independent
accreditation agencies such as JCAHO and NCQA undertake periodic accreditation of private hospitals
based on established parameters of compliance (Jacobson 2001).
In Pakistan, the devolution of Health from Federal to provincial level has provided an important stewardship
space that provinces have been quick to capture. Structures for standard setting in both private and public
sector facilities have been recently set up in two of the four provinces of Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
while the third province Sindh has recently passed supporting legislation for setting up a Health Commission
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along similar lines. The forums in the three provinces are intended to provide standard setting and formal
accreditation but short of punitive action. Accredited facilities will have an edge in governments purchasing
of private sector services that are simultaneously underway in the provinces. Much would depend on extent
of autonomy granted to regulatory structures, and robustness of monitoring and inspection systems in rolling
out of accreditation.

Financial Incentives
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Tax breaks and provision of subsidies are important concessions strategically given for expansion of private
sector into required areas of growth. Incentives can be targeted for filling geographical gaps in provision
through incentives for private sector provision in rural areas. These can also be targeted for filling service
related gaps such as setting up of Nursing & Midwifery Colleges in underserved rural locations. Conversely
removal of financial subsidies can also act as a regulatory tool such as partial fee recovery in heavily
subsidized public sector medical schools to restrict excessive production of doctors.
In Egypt for example, private health sector has benefitted from the growth incentives for general private
sector growth provided by the Ministry of Trade and Foreign Industry and the Ministry of Investment (WHOEMRO 2013). Tax breaks and reduced custom duties on import of equipment have been provided through
the Companies Corporate Law and the Investment Guarantees & Incentives Law for expansion of private
sector investment in business and also health infrastructure. Additionally, contracts have been made with
private sector for infrastructure expansion. Private health facilities have been provided with a ten year period
of tax exemption in return for providing 10% of bed capacity free of charge, as per the investment Law
designed for encouraging private sector expansion. Incentives are considered by the private sector to be
insufficient, and require careful reconsideration with private sector feedback. Consumer awareness has not
been simultaneously addressed, and most consumers follow provider reputation rather than registration
status.

Consumer Protection and Information
Consumer protection involves restricting and monitoring the advertising of private clinics, hospitals,
diagnostic centers, medical and food products for medical safety. This is in place for infant formulas, other
related food products and sometimes for medical products across more countries, but rarely seen for health
services. It also involves addressing information asymmetry in health care by providing patients with
information about clinical process of care, pricing and enhances accountability through provision of grievance
measures.
In India, the Consumer Protection Act was enacted for quick redress of patient grievances and although
resisted by the medical professionals but support by Supreme Court resulted in widespread implementation
(Bhat 1998). The Act allows for quick addressal of patient grievances, majority of doctors are aware of the
Act and its implications, and there are calls for orientation of newly graduated doctors entering private
practice. Defensively increased the use of diagnostics and spend longer time with patients but at higher fee
charges. Further the level of information shared with consumers also needs to be widened to include schedule
of fee and some incorporation of penalties for those who file false case.
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Lawsuits on medical negligence have also grown side by side with an increasing private sector and rise in
patient information. This has produced a market of medico- legal fraternity in Western countries such as
the USA and is also on the rise in countries such as Thailand (Teerawattananon Y 2013 et al). In some
countries such as Pakistan medical negligence are increasingly being picked up through Suo Motu action
by legal courts as a result of recent judicial activism. Although consumer information and empowerment
must be addressed, litigation processes are not always in the best interest of patients, and can lead to escalated
use of expensive technology by private sector in an attempt to avoid litigations.

Regulatory Structures
Professional Councils

Councils typically comprise of professionals drawn public and private colleges, and are usually based in
the Ministry of Health and only in rare cases have been given an autonomous status for independent working.
While Medical, Dental and Nursing Councils are commonly seen, however councils of paramedics have
largely been overlooked and require attention given the extensive variation in quality of paramedic training.
Professional Councils in the EMR are targeted towards the social approach to regulation overseeing issues
of patient safety and quality; however their role is mostly limited to individual providers and does not extend
to facilities. Functions found across most member states include: i) standardization of medical dental, nursing
and pharmacy curriculum; ii) inspection and licensing of teaching colleges, and registration; iii) licensing
of private health providers after completion of training; and iv) disciplining individual providers based on
professional Codes of Conduct.
Such associations are well developed in Lebanon where they engage in self accreditation of professionals.
In Iran the Medical councils role also extends to accreditation of hospitals and medical facilities, licensing,
pricing, and quality control of medicines, laboratory materials, and food products (Bakhsh AF 2006). Registry
rolls are not pro-actively maintained and many providers remain unregistered or do not renew licensing on
regular basis, due to lack of inspector checks by Councils and Ministry on maintenance of active registration
status, as well as meager budgets for registration.
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Throughout the region Professional Councils i.e. medical syndicates and associations, have been in existence
for mandatory licensing of providers at the time of entry into the health market, although extent of activity
and independence varies. Their role has been principally targeted towards education registration as opposed
to medical practice legislation.

Professional bodies are less effective than their intended role, and have been seen in certain countries to
become forums for medical self-protection. Politics, corruption and undesirable practices have been reported
from India (Bhat 1996 India), unchecked growth in medical colleges and universities without due teaching
faculty and required teaching bed capacity from Pakistan (Ghaffar et al 2013), and turf issues between public
and private sector in Yemen (WHO-EMRO 2013).

Regulatory Authorities
Regulatory bodies are increasingly found in countries both within the EMR and outside the region engaging
in health reforms. Their main function is to target health facility accreditation, inclusive of hospitals, clinics,
nursing homes, across both public and private sectors. These functions can range from mere standard setting
to accreditation and further to price control. Medical Negligence and consumer information and protection
remain a grey area that may fall across Regulatory Authorities or Councils.

Chapter 2: Regulation of Private Health Sector
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National Health Authorities have been established in Bahrain and Jordan, to oversee health services, Food
and Drugs (Ajluni MT 2006; Tahoo LA 2009). Pakistan Blood bank Regulatory Authorities have been in
place over the last decade starting with provision of training and protocols to private sector and have now
expanded to active inspections and sealing of blood bank empowered by strong Parliamentary regulation
and field budget support. Several states are making efforts to strengthen Drug Regulatory Authorities.
Extent of autonomy varies, with some regulatory structures nested within the Ministry and others as
independent structures. In Tunisia for example, the services regulation set up is within the Ministry of
Public Health, and health professionals and services are highly regulated through defined accreditation
norms that are carefully revised and updated. Tunisian regulation also extends to distribution with number
of private pharmacies restricted and defined by needs of the population. In contrast, the Jordan and Saudi
Food and Drug Administration, on the pattern of the US structure, are independent of ministries of health
(Ajluni MT 2006; Khalil R), providing them a strong leverage across the industry and providers.
However caution is needed in setting up regulatory bodies, if political will and strong governance are lacking.
In Yemen while a regulatory body exists, there are instances reported of subjective enforcement, and use
of informal payments to bypass health standards. Technical weaknesses also exist with limited data on beds,
professionals and procedures collected during the inspection visits. Such risk are also inherent for other
developing economies that are about to embark on regulation reforms.

Regulation of Insurance Schemes
Regulatory requirements and ensuing policy recommendations depend on the stage of health insurance
development in the country. A clear distinction between public and private sector roles is necessary to avoid
escalating health expenditure resulting from cream skimming of the population, unnecessary use of high
technology services, service cost escalations and fraud. Additionally, up front target setting is required to
move towards desired health outcomes that may get lost in using up less valued services and also to cover
the underserved.
Coordination is a key to successful implementation but can be problematic. Private health insurance in
Jordan operate under a general insurance law but regulation of hospitals and facilities is undertaken by both
the Ministry of Trade and Industry and the Ministry of Health resulting in instances of multiple coverage
overlaps and resulting cost inefficiencies (Ajluni MT 2006; Khalil R). In Lebanon each separate branch
of the insurance industry is associated with a separate supervising ministry, making public oversight difficult
(Ali AM 2005). Lack of an effective supply control system in Lebanon has led to cost and premium escalation
in the health sector. It has also resulted in equity gaps, with low income populations spending on average
20% of their income on health care as compared to 8% in the higher income groups (Ali AM 2005).

Consumer Protection Bodies
While consumer protection is a nascent area in the EMR, when practiced in other developing economies it
has usually relied on a multiplicity of arrangements ranging from consumer judicial courts, consumer
protection bodies and Citizen inclusive Hospital boards. However there is little evidence on relative
effectiveness of these bodies and forums.
Indias Consumer Protection Act provides quick resolution of consumer complaints through quasi-judicial
bodies at district level, avoiding lengthy litigation processes (Bhat 1996). However the implementation
experience shows room for improvement on several fronts. Lack of adequate staff and infrastructure results
in delays in consumer courts, doctors aware and wary of the Act. The absence of doctors in consumer courts
remains a contentious issue with high pressure by medical associations for inclusion but while this will be
beneficial in providing technical depth, it can lead to defensive protection of genuine neglect by fellow
doctors.
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Drug and Food Authorities
Product licensing through Drug and Food Control Authorities is a separate and substantial function undertaken
by verticalized structures within the MoH. Functions include licensing of i) industrial drug manufacturing
units; ii) registration of drugs; iii) price setting; iv) trade parameters for export and import of drugs; v)
market surveillance of quality of drugs. Essential Medicine Program of WHO has been active in supporting
Drug Regulation in many member States, however while drug Acts are found, implementation continues
to be largely weak. In certain countries Drug Regulatory Authorities have been made semi- autonomous
to remove political interference in drug licensing and surveillance.

Summary
·

Regulatory Environment: Regulation of health providers is influenced by the larger Economic and
Public Administration policy context, with Health building on important inter connections to introduce
health regulatory reforms. Economic incentives to the private sector, as in case of Egypt and Yemen,
encouraged growth in infrastructure of private sector; however these were insufficient and required
further specific incentives within Health for effective implementation. More often there is too little
formal policy in developing countries but this implicitly sets out encouragement and unchecked
growth of private sector. Regulation also requires strong and mobilized stakeholders beyond Health,
with a network of support in Planning, Finance, Legal Sectors as well as the executive leadership.
The political economy of regulation has not been studied, except in the case of pharmaceutical
reforms (Reich 1993), and needs attention by policy researchers.

·

Stewardship and Capacity for Implementation: Capacity to undertake regulation is limited in
developing economies, however all countries are practicing at least some basic form of regulation
and a number of less developed countries have an expanded set of regulations. Regulatory reforms
of private sector therefore need not be shelved until capacity building is undertaken, and can be
introduced as Little Rs (reforms) involving sharpening of existing laws or can be Large Rs
(reforms) introducing new structures and reform initiatives. Information for regulation such as
database of private providers, monitoring and inspection systems, and guiding protocols are
essential steps. A more fundamental issue preceding capacity is that of having a stewardship vision
with broadening of focus from direct service delivery harnessing the private sector towards meeting
health targets. Stewardship is a nascent notion in most Ministries of Health; hence regulation,
sector wide target setting for both and private providers, and purchasing of private sector are
needed areas that get overlooked in favor of more programmatic diseases focused activities. Formal
structures for stewardship need to be set up and well separated from the usual business of service
provision.

·

Incentives and Formal Controls: Regulation has often been regarded as a State prerogative, vertically
implemented and driven by punitive action. However there have been important changes to regulatory
approaches within the evolving context of developing countries. Regulation in Health is no more
a single stakeholder domain, involves dealing with powerful groups of private medical providers,
frontline health workers and Drug and Food industry. Multi stakeholder consultations, bargaining,
negotiating with legitimate private sector groups are now new approaches to regulation commonly
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While Drug Control structures are available across all countries however presence of Food regulatory
authorities is rare. Usually this function is coordinated with Food and Agriculture Ministries which have
at least an enforcement arm comprising of Food in sectors that can carry out checks on advertising, processing
and distribution issues related to key food products that have direct health implications such as infant milk
formulas for reduction in diarrheal deaths, iodized salt for reducing iodine deficiency, and control of sugared
and carbonated drinks.
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practiced in OECD nations. The role and inclusivity of professional associations is of key importance
because of significant leverage over both public and private sector providers. Use of incentives, and
the right set of incentives emerging from fruitful discussions, may prove to be an increasingly
powerful tool rather than lengthy litigations.
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·

Pricing control: A major challenge is regulating prices in the private health sector through regulatory
controls. Pricing regulations particularly need to be carefully developed and enforced prior to
expanding insurance based schemes so as to avoid sharp escalation in health expenditure, at expense
of little health status gain. Private hospitals and facilities are largely unregistered in EMR states are
registered with trade and investment sector whose goals of private sector encouragement and growth
maybe in conflict with equitable coverage goals of Health Ministries. While quality standards to
some extent have started being developed in EMR states, pricing remains a challenge both in terms
of who has legal authority, capacity within ministries to come up with prior costs estimates and lack
of databases for monitoring. There are also implications of substantial political resistance to price
control due to an entrenched private sector and avenues for collusion.

·

Preventive and Curative Care: Regulation practices in countries have been largely targeted towards
curative care at the detriment of important preventive and promotive care measures. While the
underlying economics behind private sector expansion has been and will remain curative and
diagnostic care, preventive care activities such as immunizations, TB DOTS, opportunistic screening
for hypertension and diabetes can be introduced as important and compulsory conditionality for
private sector expansion.
Figure 2.1: Regulatory Framework for Private Health sector
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Chapter 3:
Purchasing Private Sector Health Services

Purchasing health services by state from the non-state sector is being increasingly practiced in a number
of EMR Member States as well as countries in other regions such as Cambodia, Senegal, Costa Rica,
Nicaragua, Guatemala, Bangladesh and India (Perrot 2006). The underlying objectives can be multiple and
may include rapid roll out of services to enhance access or involve better quality and cost efficiency of
services. While there has been a tradition of purchasing private sector services support services such as
construction works, hospital food and laundry services etc. by the public sector, purchasing of primary care
and hospital services provides a new modus operandi for government in moving towards universal health
coverage (Siddiqi 2006; Loevinsohn & Harding 2005). Partnerships are being developed with the private
medical sector for hospital services, diagnostics and clinical care at primary level in a range of EMR countries.
Within the area of public health and primary care, there is now an increasing emphasis on partnering with
non-profit development organizations, over the private commercial sector, mainly driven by their perceived
attributes of more transparent and client oriented processes, ability to reach marginalized groups, and
emphasis on promotive care (Edwards & Hulme 1997).
Purchasing private health services necessitates a new role of the public sector with a shift from direct service
provision to a strategic center that commits funds for contracts, determines the service package, and selects
and monitors providers as part of buying results (Loevinsohn and Harding 2005; Taylor 2003). This is a
major departure from past policy practice whereby governments have traditionally directly provided and
funded health services. Engendering competition between private providers and stipulation of performance
targets are key areas promoted by the New Public Management Approach for effective purchasing of private
sector services (Walsh 1997).
Purchasing of private sector services has five key elements:
·
·
·
·
·

Defining services and targets;
Choosing providers;
Identifying relative responsibilities for services and financing;
Setting up structures for fund flows and implementation; and
Monitoring and oversight.

Purchasing private sector services can take different forms, with differences being in service delivery and
financing arrangements, as outlined below:
Contracting out: Contracting out involves purchasing private sector services by the public sector for a time
bound period based on a stipulated agreement and targets and using public sector financing. This has been
fairly extensively applied in a number of EMR states and will be dealt in detail in this paper.
There are two types of contracting:
· Management Contracts are whereby the budget and managerial authority of a public sector facility
gets transferred to the private sector for more efficient management and increased utilization by
patients.
· Service Delivery Contract involves public financing for provision of a defined service by the private
sector, usually specialist services that are difficult for government or in geographical areas where
government faces coverage gaps.
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Vouchers: Voucher is a pre-paid card or token provided to clients for obtaining a particular service or
package of services from trained and accredited health service providers that can be from private sector or
involve both private and public sectors (Zaidi et al. 2012). Vouchers are redeemed by the health care provider
in lieu of services provided, with funds provided by the state. Vouchers engender competition amongst
providers and are thereby expected to increase the quality of services. The difference from Contracting out
is that vouchers are distributed to clients at the community level and payments provided to health providers
on redemption while, the contracting is a single point process involving contract and its payment at single
to health provider. Vouchers have been rarely used in EMR countries, however a snapshot of global experience
has been provided.

WHO-EMRO: BACKGROUND PAPER

National Health Insurance: National Health Insurance (NHI) programs are funded by the state through
services purchased from public and private health providers. More and more, private health providers are
becoming an important source for expanding insurance coverage to uncovered population through state
spending. It involves risk pooling across entire or large segment of the population to ensure coverage for a
package of health services.
Community Based Health Insurance (CBHI): This is a risk pooling mechanism for the rural poor and
those working in the informal sectors that are less likely to be covered by formal insurance. It involves
voluntary contributions by households and management of funds by an organized and registered community
organization that in turn purchases services through formal contractual agreements from private and public
hospitals and primary facilities. CBHI schemes provide a niche for larger state funded insurance schemes,
as seen in Sub-Saharan Africa where CBHI schemes rapidly expanded and were converted into national
health insurance schemes with supplementation of state support.

Country Experiences with Purchasing Private Sector Services
Afghanistan: Afghanistans health system in the post conflict period has been based on extensive purchasing
of NGOs for service delivery at both frontline facilities as well as district hospitals. The decision to involve
the private sector emerged from almost three decades of conflict left behind a devastated health infrastructure
and the MoPH with strong technical support of international donor agencies decided to rapidly roll out
services to the population by pulling in the NGO sector to deliver district level services and outreach. In
2003 the MoPH developed a Basic Package of Health Services (primary care level) and Essential Package
of Health Services (secondary care level), which defines a set of cost-effective interventions with particular
focus on women and children, and delivered at Health Posts, staffed with Community Health Workers, Basic
Health Centers, Comprehensive Health Centers, and District Hospitals. The estimated cost of delivering the
BPHS is about US$4 per person per year; this excludes contracting and management costs as well as vertical
programs such as immunization and TB control. The coverage of BPHS included 34 provinces, 355 health
facilities, 4000 health posts, and 77% of country population (Palmer N 2006). It is mainly financed by
international development partners and co-financed by the MoPH, while the rest of the facilities are directly
managed by the MoPH through internal contracts (Sondorp 2004).
Pakistan: In Pakistan there are several indigenous examples of purchasing health services from the private
sector that have rapidly sprung up in the last decade. The major initiatives have been purposively introduced
by the state as part of health systems strengthening. The most extensive initiative is the Presidents Primary
health Care initiative in place nationally across all four provinces through which the front line government
Basic Health units have been contracted to a government sponsored NGO. Through this initiative, the
management of government Basic health Units (BHUs) have been contracted out across all four provinces,
Azad Jammu & Kashmir (AJK) and Gilgit-Baltistan to a national NGO which manages 48% of all first level
Primary Health Care (PHC) facilities (Martinez et al. 2010). Additionally from 2003 to 2008, extensive
contracting out of HIV control services was undertaken in Pakistan, with government purchasing services
from NGOs through performance based contracts (Zaidi et al 2012).
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Additionally, since devolution of Heath and other social sector subjects to the provinces in 2011, there has
been a spurt in Public Private Partnerships as part of health sector policy and reforms in the provinces, and
there are contextual variations shaped according to their particular provincial needs. The main objective has
been to fill coverage gaps in remote locations or to improve the functionality of existing services across the
province

In Sindh, as part of the reforms program, tenders have been advertised for NGO management of poorly
functioning Rural Health Centers and secondary care Taluka Hospitals in 9 districts, in an attempt to expand
access to underserved (Government of Sindh 2013). The contracts are intended to implement an Essential
Package of Health Services at facility and the outreach, and will be financed through government funds.
In recent years, Maternal and Child Health vouchers and contracting were implemented in 2 districts each
in Sindh through the Norwegian Pakistan Partnership Initiative (NPPI), involving private sector harnessing
to expand quick coverage.
In Punjab, also as part of the reforms program there is policy thinking on introduction of a voucher scheme
for maternal and child care services financed by government and international donors, however design and
implementation are still to take place (Government of Pakistan 2013). Currently, a Voucher Card Sehat
Sahoulat Card Scheme targeting both private and public providers is being implemented in two districts
for emergency maternal care services, by a national NGO but lacks funding support from state (Zaidi et
al 2013).
Baluchistan has 3 major PPP initiatives to expand access to services whereby large international NGOs,
namely Mercy Corps, Medicine San Frontier and Save the Children have entered into formal agreements
with the government to strengthen health care facilities including 90 Basic Health Units, four district hospitals
and establishment of birthing stations (Zaidi et al 2013). Unlike KP and Sindh the financing is provided by
the NGOs rather the state. However a PPP policy is under development.
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In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, out-sourcing of district health delivery to national and international NGOs is
underway in six underserved districts whereby selected NGOs would be responsible for entire district health
systems from district hospitals to primary facilities and outreach programs. Additionally, in previous years
2 selected public sector hospitals in 2 districts and focal primary care facilities are formally contracted to
four local NGOs and one INGO.

Yemen: In Yemen as yet there are instances of limited purchasing of individual private providers to perform
specialized services but lacks a larger contracting framework and policies. However, under the upcoming
law, both the private and public sector would compete to provide the healthcare services and Health
Insurance Authority will act as the regulating body to the contracting process, insurance and quality control
of services.
Jordan: The Jordanian MoH has extensive experience in hospital contracting with both public and private
sector. Since 1970 there has been steady expansion of private for-profit hospitals while MoH hospitals
instead have under-funded and consequently less developed (Musa 2006). However the MoH facilities form
the backbone of affordable Jordan hospital services providing highly subsidized (80-85 per cent) services
for the uninsured, free of charge services for the insured and the poor, and have relatively high occupancy
rates. As a result of over-burdening of public sector hospitals and capacity constraints to offer tertiary
specialized services, the MoH during the last three decades has been extensively contracting with the private
sector and other autonomous public sectors to meet the health needs of its beneficiaries and uninsured poor
people. Private sector services are purchased for the insured population, to complement public sector delivery.
The MoH has at least 8 formal contracts or agreements for purchasing health services, 5 with private
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hospitals and 3 with autonomous public providers (Musa 2006). In addition to these formal contracts, the
MoH has informal contracts with private hospitals to admit insured patients in case of emergency. Purchasing
of services is considered to have multiple objectives that include enhance equity by expanding service
coverage levels for the poor, cost curtailment of outing up expensive infrastructure through using underutilized
beds in private sector, and provide incentives to the private sector to stay in business and attract patients
from other countries (Musa 2006).
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Tunisia: Tunisia also has considerable experience with purchasing private sector to complement hospital
services. Purchasing of private services was started with Hemodialysis services for which the public sector
had limited capacity, and is expected to expand to other services (Siddiqi et al).
Egypt: Purchasing of public and private providers for delivery of the Basic Benefits Package of curative
and preventive primary health care (Egypt report 2006). The Basic Package is designated for all family
members in the population and designed to cover child care, maternal care, primary care for all groups and
laboratory services. Contracting takes place under a framework of recognized quality standards, facilitating
competition and availability. Contracting is managed by the Family Health Fund which contracts directly
with individual providers in public facilities, NGOs/private as well as through the District Provider
Organization.
Lebanon: In Lebanon there has been a well-established practice of purchase of private sector medical
services by the MoPH in order to supplement the damaged and weakened public sector during conflict.
Services are purchased for citizens that do not receive coverage from any other financing agencies (Arabia).
The MoPH contracting was initiated in 1968 and there has been a steady expansion in number of hospitals
contracted. In 2000-2001, private hospitals that were contracted by the MoPH amounted to 140 out of a
total of 167, while the number of beds amounted to 2,026 out of 11,5335,6 (Ammar 2003). The MoPH
contractual relationship with the private sector is not only limited to hospitals but also include partnership
with NGOs for the provision of primary health care services. The MoPH provides NGOs with drugs,
equipment, supplies and staff training, while NGOs in turn report on patient volumes and quality of care.
Additionally, the MoPH also has contracts for design and delivery of larger public health services such as
chronic disease control, blood bank services and emergency transportation.
Palestine: The MoH has been purchasing tertiary care from private providers. A greater role of private
sector is seen in the post-Oslo period of relative political stability and economic security of the providing
opportunity for private sector growth and complementary service delivery arrangements with the MoH
(Zaineh M 2010).
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: In Saudi Arabia with increase in the number of hospitals and simultaneous
population demand for specialized services there was increasing pressure on the MoH to effectively manage
new public sector hospitals (Khalil R). Purchasing of private sector services was carried out for effective
management of hospitals so as to supplement MoH capacity with management contracts given to international
management companies and later to local companies working alone or in partnership with foreign companies.
However the increase in expenditure after contracting and poor performance of some of the management
companies pushed the government to return to directly manage hospitals replacing contracting with autonomy
and greater flexibility provided to public sector management.

5 Ammar W. Health System and Reform in Lebanon. 2003. World Health OrganizationEastern Mediterranean Regional Office and Ministry of
Health Lebanon. Ref Type: Report
6 The soaring cost of health: no quick cure. Information International Monthly 2002
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Bahrain: In Bahrain experimentation with purchasing private sector services has started with purchasing
of international private sector services for management of newly constructed hospital in 2010. Given the
increasing maturity of the private sector there is developing policy thinking on contracting of demarcated
clinical services such as maternal delivery or beds for chronic care services but these are yet to be formalized
and implemented (Tahoo LA 2009).

Countries outside the EMR

National Health Insurance schemes in American and Western Pacific countries were introduced in the 1990s
and adapted by a few African countries in 2000s. Most of the national health insurance schemes are supported
by the state except in Nigeria and Argentina where these are partially supported b international donor funds.
Schemes managed by public funds are centrally managed while those involving premium payments or local
committees managed reimbursements for services. Population covered has been large ranging from 99%
in Taiwan, 955 in Mauritania and 705 in china while other countries had a rage of 40-70% coverage.
Purchasing from private sector was particularly seen in Ghana, Kenya and Philippines. Specific targeting
towards the poorest population groups was seen in Thailand, Peru and Argentina.
Premiums were either voluntarily contributed or deducted from salaries of the employed sector. Schemes
were also supported by taxation.
Health Vouchers: Health Voucher schemes involving purchasing of private sector services have been
implemented in at least 9 countries, that include three in South East Asia (India, Bangladesh, and Indonesia),
three in Africa (Uganda, Sierra lone and Kenya), and one country each from America (Bolivia), Western
pacific (Cambodia) and Eastern Mediterranean (Pakistan) regions. Five of the countries of implementation,
are low income countries (Uganda, Sierra Lone, Kenya, Cambodia and Bangladesh) while the remaining
four may be grouped as low middle income countries (India, Pakistan, Indonesia and Bolivia).
Voucher programs are supported by Ministries of Health (MoH) in six of the nine countries and are financed
by large NGOs in three countries through donor support. Technical assistance in all countries is provided
by international donor agencies including UN agencies (Bangladesh, Pakistan), World Bank (Bangladesh,
Indonesia), USAID (India, Pakistan) German Development Bank (Kenya, Uganda), Belgian Government
(Cambodia) and Norwegian Government (Pakistan).
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National Health Insurance: There are at least 14 countries mainly from Africa and East Asia with National
health Insurance schemes. These include Ghana (1), Taiwan (2), Peru (1), Vietnam (1), China (1), Philippines
(1) Mauritania, Argentina, Bolivia, Thailand, Mexico, Kenya and Nigeria.

Private sector purchasing through prepaid vouchers has been exclusively for basic and comprehensive
maternal care in four countries including Cambodia, Bangladesh, Uganda and Bolivia while in other countries
such as India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Kenya and Sierra Lone there were also added components of family
planning and reproductive tract infections. Five out of nine schemes provided support for caesarian sections
while all the schemes provided vouchers to avail Antenatal, Delivery and postnatal care services.
Most of the implementing countries are in the piloting stage with a limited client base. The largest interventions
with vouchers for basic and comprehensive maternal care have been in Kenya and Uganda with voucher
distribution to 38,595-60,581 clients. Other countries have much lower distribution levels ranging between
a few hundreds to few thousand clients. Schemes in Bangladesh and India have reached out to approximately
7000 clients. Lowest distribution has been reported from Sierra lone (290 clients), Indonesia (565-1164
clients), Pakistan (2000 clients) and Cambodia (2725 clients). Many of these countries are in the process
of scaling up the services. Voucher redemption has been high with 75.6% of the distributed vouchers were
redeemed in Cambodia and 98.4% in Pakistan.

Chapter 3: Purchasing Private Sector Health Services

23

Community Based Health Insurance: Distribution across countries: Substantially scoped CBHI schemes
have been implemented in at least eleven countries, including China, India and several African countries
including Ghana, Senegal, Mali, Rwanda, Congo, Sierra lone, Burkina Faso, Guinea and Togo. Of these,
seven are low income countries (Rwanda, Guinea, Mali, Togo, Congo, Burkina Faso and sire lone), three
are lower middle income countries (Ghana, Senegal and India), and one is an upper middle income
country (China).
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Community based Mutual Health Organizations (MHOs) were used in most African countries to manage
CBHI and were essentially owned, designed and managed by their community members, provided voluntary
health insurance coverage to members and contracted with health facilities to reimburse providers. In Ghana
and Congo the insurance scheme started out as a provider managed hospital based insurance and subsequently
included community in its management. In India, varying arrangements for voluntary community based
schemes were found with some managed by community based organization or NGOs on behalf of community
and in others managed by an insurance agency. In China, the new rural cooperative was designed
by the state but managed by community, with supplementary contributions provided by local and national
government.
Highest population coverage of CBHI is seen in China covering up to 86% of the population, followed by
Rwanda at 73% population coverage by 2006. High levels of coverage are also expected for Ghana which
moved to coverage of CBHI in all districts however exact population estimates are not available. In other
countries, although there was proliferation in number of CBHI schemes, population coverage estimates,
where available, indicate less than 1% coverage of population. In most countries, health centers acted as
gate-keepers for EmOC referrals and consequently contracts of CBHIs were with health centers.
In certain settings such as Ghana contracts were only with the district hospital and not lower levels of care
provision.
CBHIs largely relied on household payments while individual payments were seen in India and Burkina
Faso. Annual fixed low cost payments ranging from $1-$21.6 were charged in most countries and often
timed and collected around crop harvesting in rural communities. In most schemes there was a lack of
differential charging for the poor with all members charged at a flat rate. The exceptions included Rwanda
where the poor were exempted from payments and Burkina Faso where the poorest 20% of households paid
at half the premium. Little information is available about how decisions were taken on exemption of premium
and/ or copayment.

Implementation arrangements for purchasing
Afghanistan: In Afghanistan a dedicated unit within the MoPH is responsible for managing the contracts.
Purchasing in Afghanistan includes three different models. Large province wide lump sum contracts or sub
provincial contracts covering a cluster of districts, or a mix of both are provided. Contracted organizations
were mostly International NGOs at the outset but now local NGOs are also implementing contracts showing
an evolving internal market. NGO are supplemented with extensive capacity building support, are also
closely monitored both technically and financially mostly using a system of monthly reimbursements based
on a line item budget. NGOs are mostly reimbursed through line item reimbursement most of which is given
on advance and performance bonuses are also provided. In one instance at least, a NGOs contract as
terminated on non-performance. Both monitoring and support are provided through an international nonprofit organization that manages service delivery contracts. Performance bonuses linked to monitoring of
health services performed by an independent group. NGOs are directly accountable to the donor that funds
these contracts, and the in-country donor mission monitors NGOs performance. However the MoPH has
taken a more central role in recent years with respect to NGO monitoring.
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Egypt: Favorable policies by the Ministry of Health and Population and ministerial decrees to emphasize
the role of the contracting entity - Family Health Fund  have facilitated the purchasing of private sector
services. Successive decrees over the years have supported in terms of opening a bank account named for
the Family Health Fund of the Health Sector Reform Program., constituency of the governing bodies of
the Fund, laying the basis for management of this account and its responsibilities, and determining the
organizational structure of the Family Health Fund on the central and peripheral levels, sources of revenues
and expenditures, and legal support for contracting. Tendering processes are relatively well developed and
private providers have to pass through several steps for selection.
Jordan: Jordan is one of the few EMR states that have had extensive experience with contracting. Private
providers are reimbursed on a fee-for-service system, but this creates incentive for at times unnecessary
procedures and over billing by providers. The MoH has introduced new payment mechanisms such as leasing
private hospital beds for a fixed payment per bed or a defined payment per episode. There have been recent
efforts to undertake cost and price analysis prior to negotiations for new contracts, but is constrained by
the lack of comprehensive and advanced computerized information system. Controlling the quality of private
sector contracted services is an area that requires future attention. Presently there is a lack of treatment
protocols and guidelines to control and monitor the quality of services. Even in the presence of these
protocols, several private hospitals stated that they would be unwilling to participate in the Health Insurance.
There are also reported delays in payment due to centralized bureaucratic procedures or budgetary deficits
leading to poor satisfaction of contractees with the Health Insurance Directorate. Mutual trust and confidence
gaps have also been reported in the relationship between the MoH and the private sector.
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Pakistan: Pakistan presently has a variation in contracts and contract management for private sector purchase.
The newer initiatives in the post devolution period are evolving and are supported by formal reform strategies,
while older initiatives of BHU contracting is supported by legal frameworks but does not link up with health
policies and strategic plans. Traditional experience has been in purchasing one off services through sole
source contracting whereas dedicated structures for health services purchasing, and required monitoring and
oversight systems are presently lacking (Zaidi et al 2010). Donor assistance has recently supported price
estimation studies for implementing and contracting Essential Package of Health Services, cost and quality
guidelines for purchasing, and assisted in oversight provision on tendering process. Vouchers schemes are
newly introduced in Pakistan, and emerging lessons indicates the readiness of private commercial sector
in participating, use of existing network of community based lady health workers in implementation but
also require considerable support and supervision by the implementing NGO. Pakistan has a moderately
sufficient market of both local NGOs and INGOs in Pakistan for undertaking PPPs. Although performance
evaluations are commonly lacking, PPPs have succeeded in providing staff and support for functioning of
health facilities in remote locations (Zaidi et al 2013). However NGOs prefer contracting with intermediaries,
such as UN agencies or contract management agencies, rather than the government as centralized procedures,
instances of rent seeking and apprehensions on timely release of funds are key NGO concerns in entering
into contracts with government (Zaidi et al 2012).

Lebanon: Purchasing of private sector services is supported by a nationwide 1993 policy to support primary
health care (PHC) and integrates a network of non-governmental comprehensive health centers towards this
objective. MoPH contractual relationship with the NGO sector has been reported to be more successful than
the MoPH contractual relationship with the private hospitals in the country. Examples of contracted NGOs
include: the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA); for a chronic disease drug management program;
the Red Cross for the national blood bank and emergency transportation; the Chronic Care Center

Chapter 3: Purchasing Private Sector Health Services

25

(CCC) for the treatment of thalassemia and juvenile diabetes; the United Nations Childrens Fund. Purchasing
private sector hospital services is historically more established practice governed by a decree under which
private sector hospitals have to classify for purchasing by meeting specific standards and conditions. The
specifications have evolved over time and governed by Hospital Classification Committee.
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Tunisia: The Tunisian experience with hemodialysis services purchased from private institutions showed
that the private providers had to accept a flat rate determined by the MoH and not to charge co-payments.
There is little information on private sector comfort and compliance with this arrangement.
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: There has been an evolving experience in KSA for purchase of private sector
services. Purchasing of services started with hospital housekeeping services, then general maintenance and
catering, followed by hospital management (Khalil R). Problems initially arose due to unclear demarcations
between responsibilities of the private companies and the MoH and affected the efficiency and quality of
services provided. Lengthy procedures of obtaining clearance from the Ministry of Finance and Civil Service
Bureau delayed the execution of the contract, leading to contracting the full range of services in the hospital
to one single company. The increase of expenditure and poor performance of some of the management
companies later resulted in reverting to direct management of hospitals by the government.

Summary
Policy Commitment: Strong political support by governments has been seen across different regions for
National Health Insurance and support and up scaling of Community Based Health Insurance. However
contracting out of services in the absence of insurance schemes, and particularly when involving the leasing
out of management control to private sector has faced issues of low buying and tight control over administrative
and financial powers.
There are also concerns about the lack of commitment in low-income countries such as Afghanistan to
purchase private sector services once donor funds dry out. In Pakistan while state funds have been put up
for purchasing of private sector health services to manage government facilities as a result of support of
higher bureaucracy, there is resistance from government health staff and frontline managers, and longevity
and maturity of these measures is to be seen. Middle income countries such as Egypt and Jordan have
supportive policies while too little policy is seen in remaining EMR countries. For the GCC countries, where
public sector systems are well equipped and functioning, it is less of an imperative to purchase private
services, however purchasing needs to be given due attention to fill the two fold objectives of plugging
coverage gaps for the uninsured population, and to serve as a tool strategically harness unchecked growth
of private sector.
Nature of Service: Purchasing of focal services from private sector such as support services for hospital
kitchen, laundry, or within health services, and purchase of sub-specialized services such as hemodialysis,
diagnostics or chronic care beds have a more established tradition in EMR countries. There is lesser practice
of more radical initiatives involving large scale strategic purchasing of private medical services for insurance
and vouchers for expanding access, or contracting out the management of hospital and clinics to the private
sector for improving utilization and efficiency. There is as yet low ownership for large scale initiatives
whereby private sector harnessing is a cornerstone to meet policy goals, and need to be endorsed by
policy shifts.
Private Sector Market: Most countries have a reasonable supply of private sector for provision of hospital
services and urban and semi-urban areas; can well do with supplementing public sector bed with private
beds which may be a more cost effective option than investment in new specialist infrastructure. There are
limited number of providers in rural areas which can serve as a potential constraint to purchasing services
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in areas that are more in need. However the recent examples of Afghanistan and Pakistan shows that NGOs
can be pulled into under covered areas if adequate incentives and financing are provided, with contracting
used to create new markets within health.

Capacity Gaps in Implementation: There is limited capacity of the public sector to design, negotiate and
award health services contracts; undertake a cost, price and volume analysis; optimize payment methods;
and effectively monitor performance (Siddiqi et al 2006). With the exception of Egypt and Afghanistan,
performance indicators are rarely included in the design of contracts. Management information systems in
most counties were inadequate to monitor the performance of private providers. Third-party evaluations of
purchased services were rare and only seen in Afghanistan and in one instance in Pakistan, with both of
these instances supported by donor funding.
Financial Protection: There is considerable variation in terms of financial protection to the poor offered
by private sector purchasing initiatives and can benefit from more learning across countries. Some of the
National Health Insurance schemes have exempted the poorest from premium payment; however there is
lack of standardization in terms of financial protection. Implementation of Voucher schemes from Pakistan
and other regions shows that these provide free cover for promotive care visits, and more than half also
cover the cost of complicated deliveries including Caesarian sections. Community based insurance schemes
involve premium from community enrollees, and copayment in the range of 10-20%, with some instances
of exemption of the poor from copayments. Insufficiency of funds has remained a major concern with
experience from Nigeria suggesting that funds provided under HIPC agreement were limited and could
cover only a fraction of the target population of pregnant women (Briscombe 2010). Similar concerns have
also been reported from Argentina where financial sustainability and limited package of services are a
question mark (Cortez R 2009).
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Preparatory Arrangements: The legal and administrative framework for contracting out health services
needs updating in many countries. Experience with contracting over a number of years has helped in
developing the required changes in bureaucratic process to avoid delays, issue with fund flows and necessary
accountability. Politics of contracting out has been less well reported, however there have been instances
of parties with vested interests gaining control over the contracting process. Independent purchasing structures
and some level of third party oversight of the contracting process needs to be incorporated as government
Health Ministries and Departments get reorganized for purchasing of services. Independent structures as
opposed to those embedded within the usual running of Health Ministries, are also important for timely flow
of funds and avoidance of cash flow problems for purchased services. Most member states lack a dedicated
unit for purchasing services. Transaction cost estimations of costs required for implementation and monitoring
of purchasing were also usually not carried out.

Targeting the under-served: Voucher schemes and National Health Insurance schemes invariably involve
some level of targeting mechanism to reach the poor and underserved population. Experience from other
regions shows that vouchers specifically targeted the poor and used systematic means. These also have
administrative cost implications, however there is little reporting on proportion of costs spent on implementing
systems versus actual services. Moreover, there have been instances when lack of proper dissemination of
information to the eligible population deprived the poorest women from making use of voucher schemes.
National Health Insurance schemes although having a pro-poor focus in intent have less vigorous means
verification. Most contracting out initiatives across different countries have not had a pro-poor focus in
contract design however recent primary care focused contracting initiatives in other regions, particularly
in South Asia, have targeted the poor using systematic methods.
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Figure 3.1: Purchasing Framework for Private Health Sector
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Chapter 4:
Performance Outcomes of Public Private Partnerships:
Existing Evidence
While public private partnerships are well underway in several countries and incrementally started in others,
a major question arises about their effectiveness so far in expanding access, increasing quality and efficiency.
We fill some of these knowledge gaps by highlighting solid performance outcomes achieved and comparative
strengths of Contracting Out, Community Based Health Insurance (CBHI), Vouchers, and National Health
Insurance. Data from EMR Member States is extremely limited and therefore a snapshot of evidence is
presented from other countries.

Performance of PPP in EMR Countries
An increasing number of PPPs have been implemented in the EMR and developing countries. However, a
major gap is the lack of collated evidence on PPP performance to choose between competing PPP models.
Despite many international publications on PPPs, there is need to sift for high quality evidence for basing
conclusive recommendations and is provide through a process of systematic review of evidence.
Pakistan: There are number of initiatives where the public sector fully or partially finances the NGO sector
for primary healthcare service provision, usually through contracting out and voucher schemes. The Presidents
Primary Health Care Initiative (PPHI) comprises the largest contracting out initiative which started in 2005;
however, other smaller contracting out schemes have also emerged. Third party evaluation of PPHI revealed
general increase in BHU utilization and improvement in some aspects of quality (Martinez et al. 2010).
Outpatient attendance increased by 20% on average in PPHI districts. Use of antenatal care, postnatal visits
and facility based births also increased in PPHI districts compared to those managed by health department.
Customer satisfaction was better in PPHI districts mainly due to improved quality of services (Martinez et
al. 2010). Table 2 in annexure provides details of impact of contracting out on service utilization and quality
improvement. Another initiative of purchasing maternal and neonatal services from private sector in rural
health centres showed higher utilization of ANC, facility based births, PNC and newborn care in contracted
out centres compared to non-contracted. However, it was insufficient to improve overall coverage of maternal
and newborn services at population level (Zaidi S et al. 2013).
Three different voucher schemes have been implemented for maternal and neonatal health services in
Pakistan. However, evaluation is available from one of the schemes only. Results of evaluation showed
increase in ANC (21.6%), PNC (31.2%), and facility based births (19.2%) among beneficiaries of voucher
scheme after one year of implementation (Sohail A 2011). Subsequent section provides details of impact
of voucher scheme on service utilization and quality improvement.
Iran: Like Pakistan, Iran has also experienced indigenous initiative of purchasing primary healthcare services
from cooperatives at small scale. The Ministry of Health and Medical Education has pilot purchasing of
primary care services in several provinces of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Although no comprehensive
evaluation has been conducted, early evidence suggests that purchasing primary health services from private
sector has helped improve certain aspects of access and quality, and decreased the cost of services. (Siddiqi
S 2006).
Maternal health care indices were also better in CHCs nearly in all areas indicating that they perform better
than PHCs. Contrary to other preventive health care services, maternal health care is widely provided in
private clinics in Iran but the difference is that services delivered in PHCs are free of charge and focused
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on essential health cares aimed to increase equity of receiving these services. When Cooperatives are entered
in this area, it seems that many problems with PHCs like low availability, lower quality and lower client
satisfaction can be cleared while preserving the advantages of public service delivery. Furthermore, the
study of PPP case in Iran reveals that subsidizing payment system is different from a fixed subsidization
and per capita payment in that amount of payment can differ depending on quality of services as evaluated
periodically by provincial health department. Management process inside each cooperative can be quite
effective because of two reasons: first that Health Cooperatives are not large scaled and have small number
of personnel, and second that all of the personnel in a Health Cooperative are responsible for their practice
that directly affects their income by improving the quality of their service.
Afghanistan: Purchasing of services from local and international non-governmental organizations (contracting
out) and from MoPH facilities (contracting in) to provide a Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS) and
hospital based services in post conflict period. A recent balanced score card assessment demonstrated some
improvement in health services. Nationally, the benefits of BPHS were reaching to the poor than less poor,
and to women than men, making it more equitable. However, some serious deficiencies were found in five
domains, and particularly in counselling patients, providing delivery care during childbirth, monitoring
tuberculosis treatment, placing staff and equipment, and establishing functional village health councils
(Peters 2007).
Jordan, Lebanon and Tunisia: Jordan, Lebanon and Tunisia have had extended experience with contracting
out of hospital services. In Lebanon, the public sector outsourced a wide range of services in over 100
hospitals to cover its uninsured population. Some limitations were fragmentation of the contracting process
between different agencies, the limited leverage of public over private sector, the inability to contain escalating
health care costs and lack of public sector capacity to monitor performance (Siddiqi S et al. 2006). Jordan
showed that most of the purchasing arrangements with private sector had positive impacts and resulted in
improved access, efficiency, sustainability, promoted public health goals, and created an environment
conducive to public- private collaboration (Siddiqi S et al. 2006).
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA): In order to close the gaps in skills necessary to run the hospitals,
government agencies contracted with management companies to either fully or partially manage their
hospitals. Few years ago most of the hospitals were either fully or partially managed by a private company.
But increase of expenditure and poor performance of some of the management companies, convinced the
government to return to direct operation in a program format.
Egypt: The Family Health Fund is permitted to contract with a wide range of public and private providers.
The main role of the Fund is to purchase curative and preventive primary health care to be extended to
secondary care in the future. Some facilities show interest to join the program, but need major renovation
such as equipment and furniture to meet the quality standards, and at the same time they are not willing to
account for such expenses and changes.
Palestine: MoH is contracting-out tertiary care from private providers. Palestinian health care provider and
beneficiary survey2005, which assessed beneficiaries perceived satisfaction of quality of health care services
in both of public and private sectors, showed that the majority of patients were more satisfied from the care
provided by the private sector compared with those provided by public and NGO sectors in terms of both
quality and availability of care.
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Performance of Global PPPs: Evidence from numbers
The data presented is restricted to high quality studies and the tracer lens of maternal and newborn care
has been taken to see effect on primary care (Zaidi et al 2013). Similar data on curative care was not
sufficiently available.

Contracting out with private sector for primary healthcare

Service Utilization: Contracting out had positive impact on reproductive health services utilization (table
4.1 annex). Increase in utilization of ANC is reported in India (Baqui 2009), Bangladesh (World Bank 2005),
Cambodia (Bloom 2005), Bangladesh Urban PHC (ADB 2007), and a smaller suggestive increase in Pakistan
(Martinez 2010). Similarly, contracting out health services with private sector has shown increase in facility
based births (institutional delivery) in Guatemala (Bloom 2005), India (Bhat 2009, Baqui 2009), Bangladesh
(ADB 2007), Bolivia (Lavadenz 2001), and Pakistan (Martinez 2010). There is inconclusive evidence for
impact of contracting on service utilization of C-section, complicated deliveries and PNC. However, there
has been no improvement in immunization coverage with contracting out, due to incomplete transfer of
outreach facilities and responsibilities. There has been very little assessment of impact of contracting out
on care seeking in childhood illnesses. Few available evaluations of contracting out have also shown reduction
in Malnutrition (Karim R. 2003; Marek T 1999).
Quality of care: Available studies have documented improvement in only few aspects of quality of care
while information about process of care is missing (Zaidi S et al 2012). PPHI from Pakistan showed
improvement in: infrastructure; availability of drugs, staff and supplies; and patient satisfaction (Martinez
2010; Loevinsohn 2009). Evidence from Bangladesh Urban PHC shows significantly higher satisfaction
amongst female clients of contracted BHUs over non-contracted BHUs but no information about infrastructure
and process (ADB 2007). Contrary to that, the Indian Chiranjevee scheme reports no significant increase
in patient satisfaction as a result of contracting to private providers (Bhat 2009).
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Review of evidence suggests that information on performance of contracting schemes addressing maternal
care mainly relates to service coverage and some reporting on quality of care indicators. There is less
information about equitable utilization, OOP reduction and health outcomes. The studies had minimum
intervention period of 1 year and maximum intervention period of 5 years.

Equity Aspects: Very few studies have reported effect of contracting on equity. No significant benefit can
be traced for disadvantaged population as a result of contracting in Cambodia (Bloom 2005, Bhushan 2002),
Guatemala (Danel & LaForgia 2005), and Pakistan (Loevinsohn 2009).

Community Based Health Insurance Schemes (CBHIs)
Available evidence on performance of CBHI relates mainly to health care utilization, out-of-pocket expenditure
reduction, enrolment characteristics of insured members, and assessment of equitable utilization of service
coverage. There is less information about quality of care.
Service Utilization: In Rwanda (Schneider et al 2001), Zaire (Criel 1999), and China (Long 2010b), there
has been increase in C-section rates after introduction of CBHIs. Similarly, facility based births (institutional
deliveries) increased in China (Long 2010b), Rwanda (Soeters 2006), Senegal (Smith 2006), Mali and
Ghana. CBHI has also shown increase in 4+ ANC visits in Mali (Smith 2008) and China (Long 2010a)
while suggestive increase is seen in first trimester ANC visits in Senegal (Smith 2006) and some sites in
Rwanda but not in other sites (Schneider et al 2001) (table 4.2 annex). CBHI schemes mostly have not
assessed neonatal and child health service utilization.
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Out of Pocket Expenditure: Reduction in OOP is seen across CBHIs in all six countries (Zaidi S et al
2012). Specific reduction in delivery related expenditure reported from Senegal and Mali shows 12 to 13
times higher likelihood of reduced expenditure in insured women for delivery as compared to non-insured
(Smith 2008). For Rwanda and India descriptive statistics are present suggesting OOP expenditure
reduction by a third in Rwanda (Soeters 2006) and halving of catastrophic hospitalizations in India
(Ranson 2002).
Equity Aspects: Enrolment related evidence from Senegal, Rwanda, Mali and Ghana and is highly indicative
of adverse selection. Enrolment, utilization and OOP expenditure reduction are significantly associated with
higher income, higher education, those residing closer to health facilities and in urban areas (Zaidi S et al
2012). Although CBHIs were implemented in disadvantaged communities however exemption mechanism
for those who could not afford were missing in most schemes, and maybe the underlying reason for regressive
findings. Interestingly evidence from India focusing on catastrophic rather than general OOP reduction is
suggestive of greatest decrease in the lowest income tercile (Ranson 2002).
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Vouchers Schemes
Review of evidence highlights that information on performance of maternal voucher schemes is confined
to two countries and is mainly related to service coverage with some information on targeting. There is no
information about quality of services and about impact on health outcomes. The studies had minimum
intervention period of 1 year and maximum intervention period of 2 years.
Service utilization: Studies from Pakistan (Agha S 2011) and Bangladesh (Ahmed S 2010) report positive
impact in treatment for complicated delivery (table 4.3 Annex). Beneficiaries of Voucher schemes in both
countries were highly likely to use pre and postnatal care, and deliver in health facility. Neonatal and child
health service utilization has not been assessed with voucher schemes.
Quality of Care: Significant improvement in various qualities of care parameters including antenatal
checkups, behaviour and counselling practices due to voucher scheme is reported. The findings also show
reduction in pregnancy complications and lesser delay in service provision (Zaidi S et al 2012).
Equity aspects: There is low volume of equity related data on maternal voucher schemes, and is a major
gap given that considerable efforts of these programs are invested in systematic targeting of beneficiaries
(Zaidi S et al 2012). Although, Agha (2011) shows that majority of vouchers were distributed to the poor
with 54% to the most under privileged quintile and 24% to the second most under privileged quintile. Overall
utilization of services remained higher in upper socio-economic strata but lower two strata showed higher
improvement in utilization in the one year period as compared to control after interventions despite lower
overall utilization remained lower. Similarly those closer to health facility and having higher education
levels reported greater odds of utilization.
Ahmed S et al (2010) also shows lower overall utilization for the poorest quintiles in Bangladesh, however
there is no control for confounding effects.
Hence, findings from both Pakistan and Bangladesh are indicative that even when voucher distribution is
progressive with greater penetration to the poorer groups, their redemption will still be regressive with
poorer groups making lesser use of services but at least showing visible improvement in utilization over
their previous rates.
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National health insurance
Information on performance of National Health Insurance (NHI) schemes relates mainly to health care
utilization, and assessment of equitable utilization of service coverage. Enrolment characteristics of insured
members are provided only by 1 study. There is no information about quality of care and out-of-pocket
expenditure reduction. The studies had minimum intervention period of 1 year.

Equity Aspects: The study from Ghana shows that enrolment is positively related to higher income and
education status while there is no significant difference in terms of urban/ rural residence (Chankova S
2009). Largely inequitable results are seen for utilization of maternal services. There is more likelihood of
health facility utilization for C-section amongst higher income terciles in China (Wei-Wei 1998) and amongst
more educated members in Taiwan (Chen 2001). Significant positive correlation of institutional deliveries
with income and education is seen in Vietnam and Philippines and as well for members residing in urban
areas in Philippines (Sepheri 2008; Kozhimannil 2009). Similar results are seen for ANC utilization with
higher likelihood linked to income, education and urban areas (Zaidi S et al 2012).

Summary
Global evidence provides encouraging and significant evidence of overall impact of PPPs on increasing the
use of primary care services but there is uneven increase across different services and much depends on
design of PPPs. Within the PHC area, most consistent increase is seen in institutional delivery, followed
by ANC, there are mixed results for PNC and Nutrition, and little impact on immunization. Evidence is
inconclusive for EMOC and neonatal health services. Amongst the different PPPs, vouchers have the best
performance, at least for safe motherhood, followed by CBHI and NHI schemes. However, PPPs have
generally not reached the poorest segments of the population. Although there is reaching out to the poor,
the benefits within are to those who reside closer to health facilities, have higher levels of education and
income than more marginalized groups in the community.
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Service Utilization: Significant increase in C-section rate is reported from China and Taiwan, mixed results
are seen in Ghana and there is incomplete reporting from other schemes. However, except for one scheme;
none of the other schemes showed a significant increase in institutional delivery. In Peru, insured beneficiaries
were twice as likely to deliver in health facility compared to uninsured (McQuestion 2006).
ANC utilization is reported by nearly all studies but except for Taiwan where there is significant increase
in 4+ ANC visits (Chen 2001), there hasnt been any improvement reported in other schemes (table 4.4
annex). Almost negligible information is available on neonatal and child health service utilization with NIH
schemes.

There is inconclusive evidence as to whether PPPs can bring about a reduction in patient OOP expenditure.
Few instances of reduction in client expenditure have been reported for CBHIs and NHI schemes but there
are data gaps for contracting out and voucher schemes.
Also there is lesser information available that whether PPPs can or cannot induce higher quality of
services from the private sector. Generally, purchasing has resulted in improvement of infrastructure;
availability of drugs, staff and supplies, while information on technical process of care remains thin.
There have also been instances of staff demotivation as a result of increased patient volume from
insurance schemes.
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Chapter 5:
Emerging Lessons, Recommendations and Proposed
Framework
I. Overview of Policy Drivers and Constraints
Attainment of Universal Health Coverage is a progressive realization for EMR Member States and can be
accomplished by expanding breadth of population covered by services, depth of services covered and
expanding extent of financial risk protection. The private sector has grown exponentially in most EMR
states, and remains an untapped key partner for moving towards Universal Health Coverage. Regulation,
information provision and purchasing of services remain important tools for harnessing private sector towards
strategic UHC goals.
Private Sector Potential & Pitfalls: Private sector growth has taken place with too little policy to guide
growth. Private sector utilization is particularly high in EMR states where public sector spending on health
is low and consequently shows private sector emergence as a result of insufficient or under performing
public sector services. Essential information on private sector composition, service coverage, quality and
pricing continues to be patchy, although notable efforts have started out in many states.
Private sector contribution varies according to the context of particular countries, and hence demands locally
responsive strategies for harnessing the value added services. While a certain level of overlap between
private and public sector is healthy for quality of services, much depends on development of informed state
policies for channelizing the growth and distribution of private sector for access to UHC. In certain states,
government partnerships with private sector have focused on specialty hospital services to complement gaps
in government services, in others states these have been targeted towards private sector management
experience of hospital and diagnostic facility, while in yet other countries private health sector has established
itself in providing primary care services in urban centers and also expanding to rural areas.
Latest evidence shows that despite apprehensions, the quality of private sector services is reasonably
satisfactory in GCC and middle income countries, and further improvements are needed in the area of staff
refresher trainings for staff, health communication to patients and reporting of data to ministries. However,
in low income countries private sector faces serious quality gaps and caution is needed in first careful
capacity building and stewardship of private sector before involvement in UHC schemes.
Charging for health services by private sector goes largely unregulated except in certain states of the EMR
that have attempted to cover the unaffording clientele through state purchasing of private sector services.
Recent most evidence shows that charges even for routine inpatient admission such as C-sections can be
at catastrophic level in some countries requiring strong regulations while in others the private sector market
is offering competitive affordable prices. Pre-paid cover for health services is found in middle income
countries but needs extension, is low in lower income countries placing patients at risk of debt or service
denial, while consumer accountability is generally weak with poor availability of pricing guidelines across
most EMR states.

Can Public Private Partnerships Deliver?
Global evidence provides encouraging and significant evidence of overall impact of PPPs on increasing the
use of primary care services but there is uneven increase across different services and much depends on
design of PPPs. There is inconclusive evidence as to whether PPPs can bring about a reduction in patient
OOP expenditure. Few instances of reduction in client expenditure have been reported for CBHIs and NHI
schemes but there are data gaps for contracting out and voucher schemes.
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Regulation & Information Provision: A Matter of Approach, Coordination & Enforcement
Regulation of health providers including Industry in some form is in practice in all EMR states. However
this is the area where least innovations have been practiced, practice has been confined to entry of individual
practitioners in the market and drug licensing and trade. Regulatory approaches have typically relied on
Professional syndicates, enactment of punitive laws recourse to which involve lengthy litigations and lack
budgets and personnel for field implementation.

For enactment of regulation, policy coordination is required between larger economic private sector growth
policies and those enacted by Health  are these in synch for uncontrolled growth, confined growth or
exertion of controls? Regulation of insurance can be particularly complex with coordination required with
multiple entities for different tasks.
Implementation of health services regulation on private hospitals, nursing homes and clinics will remain a
key challenge. The notion of stewardship is only beginning to be realized in Ministries of Health and needs
to be practically backed up by formal dedicated structures for regulation either within or outside the Ministry
of Health. While technical aspects of regulation implementation such as databases for private sector mapping,
accreditation tools and checks have been highlighted before, the essential approach to regulation remains
undecided and uncertain in most states. Multi-stakeholder regulation that includes private sector as an entity
as opposed to government only led regulation, use of incentives and self-accreditation options as opposed
to punitive action and concept of bargaining and negotiation rather than imposition are new approaches for
governments to consider.
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Health services regulation of the private sector remains a grossly overlooked area across most EMR states
and is critically required to harness the expanding private sector towards UHC. Moreover, regulation where
present is targeted towards curative care overlooking involvement of private sector into preventive, promotive
and rehabilitative services while some middle income countries have taken steps in this direction, those
states with higher private sector utilization are yet to be mobilized and the area so far remains in infancy.
Such regulation will need to involve oversight on service packages, distribution, quality and pricing; however
any of these can be an important entry point for extending modifications to the others.

Provision of consumer information from minimal to more comprehensive levels has been routinely practiced
for drugs and food products across all member states. However extension of consumer information for health
services as a tool for patient safety and on pricing of private health services for financial access has been
less well practiced. Consumer information and protection relies on a multiplicity of arrangements across
Legal Ministry, Health Ministry, Consumer Bodies and Private Health Providers, and if hastily introduced
can lead to delays in redress, unnecessary litigations and growth of expensive medical technology as defensive
mechanism by medical sector.

Purchasing Health Services: Financial, Technical, Market & Political Considerations
Purchasing private health services has been more widely practiced than regulation in developing economies
and also has a growing body of evidence on its effectiveness. Purchasing provides formal controls to the
state over cost, quality and service package offered by private sector. Purchasing of private sector services
for Health initially started out in the EMR in the area of support services for hospital, expanded to hospital
beds and specialty services, and more recently has involved purchasing primary and preventive care services
from NGOs.

Chapter 5: Emerging Lessons, Recommendations and Proposed Framework
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Purchasing by the state in the EMR has usually been through evolving national health insurance schemes,
contracting out the management of government health facilities, contracting out private sector for specific
service delivery schemes, and in a few instances through health vouchers and community health insurance.
In most EMR states the agenda has been to complement public sector services in areas of gaps, and only
in rare instances has radical purchasing of private sector as the mainstay of stay of UHC response been
practiced.
Policy support has been higher for insurance schemes that involve purchase of limited private sector services
alongside public sector services, as insurance schemes are seen to There has been lukewarm support and
even active resistance for contracting out management of government facilities to private health sector or
commissioning NGOs to supplement services as these are seen by local level implementers as diversion
of state budget and control to private sector. Support for health vouchers is donor driven, confined mainly
to Pakistan, and there is absence of state funding for up scaling, while community health insurance schemes
have not taken off due to low levels of community organization as well as weak organizational support by
the state. The politics of purchasing is also complicated by private sector-government relations, with
private sector concerns of government as a reliable payer and state concerns on profit making by private
sector. Slow and cautious expansion of purchasing over time has been seen for better trust and
harmonial working between public and private sectors, with issue resolved through relational rather than
punitive mode.
Two other factors are pertinent when purchasing private sector services. Demarcated structures for purchasing
of services are needed in Ministries of Health, capacities built for open competitive tendering to avoid
monopolies of a single organization, prior estimation of unit costs, writing of contracts with service delivery
targets and independent monitoring are technical prerequisites for private sector purchasing. There are often
concerns whether there is a sufficiently developed private sector market in EMR to contract with, comprising
in particular a sufficient number of organizations having programmatic and financial absorptive capacity
rather than individual providers. Contracting experiences has shown that the private sector grows and adapts
in response to purchasing.
Costs of purchasing private sector services can vary with extent of sophistication and can be high, and need
to be built into state budgets prior to embarking on PPPs. Systematic means targeting to reach the poorest
as part of insurance or voucher schemes, can be particularly high and measures to reduce include piggybacking
these on databases of social protection schemes. On the supply side global budgets and per capita payments
are less costly financing measures for private provider payments as opposed to volume and service based
payments, but involves an inherent level of flexibility transferred to the private provider. Delays in release
of funding as a result of layers of bureaucracy is an overarching issue across several PPPs, and calls for
upfront designing of speedier fund flow mechanisms with some level of institutional reorganization, as part
of rolling out implementation.
Lastly, while the policy push for PPPs has usually come from international donors there needs to be caution
in use of donor funding for embarking of PPPs for UHC as this can lead to fragile programs. International
partner involvement may instead be best used for short and medium terms technical assistance in harnessing
private sector for UHC.

36

Chapter 5: Emerging Lessons, Recommendations and Proposed Framework

·

Supporting Country Commitment: WHO-EMRO can foster dialogue with Ministries of Health of
member states at Regional and Country level to include private sector harnessing for UHC as an
intrinsic health agenda.

·

Development Partner Coordination: Providing catalytic support for regional and country level
coordination amongst partners to harmonize positions on private sector harnessing, for supporting
country governments.

·

Policy dialogue between public and private sectors: Facilitating dialogue and communication between
Ministries of Health, line Ministries, private sector and international development partners through
setting up of policy roundtables for development of inclusive, realistic and context specific country
priorities for private sector.

·

Diffusion of Innovations: Provide platforms for synthesis and presentation of evidence on PPP
innovations from other regions and countries, so as to allow for cross country learning and policy
diffusion.

·

Stewardship Forums: Support country government in development of stewardship forum and
governance bodies for harnessing private sector potential towards UHC. Such bodies can take the
form of Regulatory Authorities, Health Commissions, PPP Units or Contracting out

·

Mapping of Private Sector: Provide tools and technical assistance in undertaking mapping surveys
of private sector in member states, with a focus on composition of private sector, geographical
concentration and extent of activity across services.

·

Technical Assistance: Provide and mobilize technical support in designing and undertaking PPPs,
providing attention to Contracting Out, insurance schemes, Regulation etc.

·

Best Buys: Collate, synthesize and disseminate a list of best buys for PPPs, based on experiences
from within and outside the region, for sharing with country governments.

·

Evaluation of PPPs: Develop comprehensive and elastic frameworks and tools for evaluating PPPs
for use of member states, incorporating measurement of hard data as well as capturing design and
health systems related influencing factors.

Chapter 5: Emerging Lessons, Recommendations and Proposed Framework
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II. Emerging Priorities for WHO-EMRO in Enhancing Private Sector Harnessing for UHC
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III. Proposed Framework of Action for Engaging Private Sector in Moving Towards UHC
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Annexure 1:
Tables on Performance Impact of PPP Schemes

Table 4.1: Impact of Contracting Schemes on Service Utilization
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Table 4.2: Impact of CBHI Schemes on Service Utilization
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Table 4.3: Impact of Voucher Schemes on Service Utilization
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Table 4.4: Impact of National Health Insurance on Service Utilization
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